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Welfare to Work 
 
Fundamental changes in the nature of and availability of employment have intensified 
the pressures being experienced by welfare systems throughout the OECD. In 
particular, it is suggested that long term unemployment and social exclusion are being 
exacerbated by changes in the character and availability of ‘entry level’ jobs and by 
the passive nature of traditional social assistance and unemployment compensation 
systems.  
 
In response to the OECD’s ‘Jobs Strategy’ (1994) and the EU’s ‘Employment Pact’ 
Government’s are modernising the relationship between their benefit systems and 
labour markets. New and tougher work tests have been introduced, especially for the 
unemployed, and these are linked with voluntary or mandatory attendance at a diverse 
range of job search, employment and training programmes. In what the Director 
General of DGV hailed as a “decisive shift away from passive to active measures” EU 
Member States have committed themselves to providing a ‘New Start’ for all those 
under 25 unemployed for six months and for those over 25 after a year out of work 
(Laarson, 1998, p.6).  
 
The shared aim of what could now be described as these ‘welfare to work’ regimes is 
to increase economic activity rates through the creation of  ‘active’ benefit systems 
which improve employability, reinforce work incentives and reduce costs and welfare 
dependency.  Significantly, the new regimes are increasingly being aimed at all those 
of working age, partly because of falling unemployment but also because the growth 
in fiscal costs has been linked directly with increased numbers of economically 
‘inactive’ lone parents and people on disability benefits (who once inside the benefit 
system tend to rely on their welfare payments for much longer periods than the 
registered unemployed). 
 
At the heart of this modernisation of welfare states has been a continuing attempt to 
define and create a new type of social contract between the individual and the state. 
Whether it be the ‘reciprocal’ or ‘mutual’ obligation of Australia; the transition from 
‘sharing’ to ‘earning’ of the Netherlands; or the ‘helping hand’ rather than ‘handout’ 
rhetoric of the USA and UK, active job search and employment requirements are 
being intensified for all working age people who rely on social assistance payments. 
For some this represents a welcome modernisation of the post war welfare state 
(Milliband, 1999). It involves creating a system ‘in tune’ with modern social and 
labour market realities with a decisive shift from simple ‘benefit handouts’, which 
failed to tackle exclusion, towards services which enable and incentivise individuals 
to become more self sufficient. For others, by contrast, it represents the transition 
from the Keynsian welfare state to an Orwellian sounding “Schumpterian workfare 
state” where more or less coercive benefit regimes are aimed at re-integrating the 
unemployed “into a post-Fordist labour process” (Jessop, 1994, p. 32; Peck and Jones, 
1995; Tonge, 1999).  
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Whatever the theoretical position taken it is clear that welfare to work strategies are 
not just about the abstract redefinition of rights and responsibilities, or the creation of 
new opportunities, incentives and sanctions. Governments have coupled changed 
policy objectives with organisational reform and have linked the transition to active 
benefit regimes with radical changes in the bureaucracies delivering and 
administering programmes. New post-Fordist institutions are emerging where 
monolithic national service agencies are now being required to work in local 
partnerships and public sector monopolies, in the delivery of employment and training 
services, are being dismantled to be replaced by quasi-markets (Finn, 2000; de 
Koning et al, 1999; Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). These organisational reforms are 
linked with the introduction of new management techniques and a new generation of 
front line employment advisers or case managers who have the task of turning 
abstract incentives, opportunities and sanctions into real day to day choices.  
 
New Labour and Welfare to Work 
 
The New Labour Government has put itself at the forefront of this international 
process of ‘welfare reform’. Shortly after his electoral victory the British Prime 
Minister suggested that the “greatest challenge” for his “welfare to work” 
Government was “to refashion our institutions to bring the new workless class back 
into society and into useful work” (PM, 1997, p. 4). The objectives of this 
transformation are both economic and cultural. One aim is to increase the sustainable 
level of employment by improving the employability of more benefit claimants and 
placing them into work. The other is to change the culture of the benefits system 
towards independence and work rather than payments and dependence (HMSO, 1999, 
Chapter 4).  
 
The following sections describe and assess the key changes that have been introduced, 
involving the introduction and rapid extension of a variety of New Deal programmes; 
the role of the public Employment Service (ES); the delivery of these programmes 
through local partnerships and a new generation of ‘front line’ New Deal personal 
advisers; tax and benefit reform to ‘make work pay’; and the ‘activation’ of the 
benefit system, where lone parents, carers and people receiving disability benefits, can 
now be required to attend work related interviews and assessments.  
 
The New Deals and Attendance Requirements  
 
The Labour Government’s New Deals are made up of a complex mix of mandatory 
and voluntary job search advice, employment and training programmes. The overall 
objectives of the various New Deals are:  
 
• to increase long term employability and help young and long-term unemployed 
people, lone parents and disabled people into jobs; and  
• improve their prospects of staying and progressing in employment. 
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Participation in the New Deals for the registered unemployed usually commences 
with an intensive advisory ‘Gateway’ process aimed at helping an individual find 
work, followed by a more or less resource intensive range of employment and training 
options which aim to improve individual employability. There is a ‘follow through’ 
process of advice and support for those who do not get a job by the time they 
complete their option. Young people under 25 years of age enter the New Deal after 
six months unemployment, those over 25 enter after 18 months. Participation is 
compulsory for those aged under 50. 
 
The Labour Government has emphasised that the New Deals for the unemployed 
represent a new balance of ‘rights and responsibilities’ within which there is “no .. 
option of an inactive life on benefit” (PM, 1997, p. 7). In practice the disciplinary 
regime of the New Deal builds on the regulations introduced in 1996 following the 
introduction of the Jobseekers Allowance. These JSA rules stipulate that to be eligible 
for benefit unemployed individuals must enter a Jobseekers Agreement specifying the 
steps they intend to take to look for work. Disallowance or sanctions of varying 
severity can be imposed on those who refuse ‘suitable’ employment, fail to actively 
seek work, or who become unavailable for work. Officials also have a discretionary 
power enabling them to issue a 'Jobseekers Direction' requiring an individual to look 
for work in a particular way or to take other steps to ‘improve their employability’.  
 
In practice most unemployed people have participated voluntarily in the New Deal but 
by 2000 the numbers who had experienced ‘mandatory referrals’ and/or sanctions was 
increasing. Those who refused to take up places or who left them early, without ‘good 
cause’ (such as, health reasons, unreasonable travelling time, etc.), faced escalating 
sanctions. Initially they could be subject to a two week benefit sanction, a second 
refusal would result in a four week sanction, and a third refusal would result in a loss 
of benefit for up to six months (Chatrick and Convery, 2000)  
  
New Deals have also been created for working age people living on state benefits who 
were previously regarded as ‘economically inactive’. For example, from 2000 the 
wives or dependent partners of those unemployed people who are eligible for the 
young person’s New Deal, and who do not have child care responsibilities, have been 
required to register and regularly sign on as unemployed and participate in ES 
programmes and, when eligible, enter what is called the ‘New Deal for Partners’. 
Initially this new requirement applies only to small numbers of 18 to 24 year old 
partners but the intention is to gradually extend this approach to the older age groups. 
In a context where both partners in most British families of working age now have 
jobs the aim is to end the assumption of ‘spouse dependency’ in the benefit system. 
 
There are also voluntary New Deal programmes for lone parents and for people with 
disabilities. Lone parents who make their first claim for state benefits or whose 
youngest child starts school are given advice, directed as to where they might get jobs 
or upgrade their skills and advised about any child-care support that can be obtained.  
The programme for people with disabilities has been less prescriptive, and through a 
broad range of pilot programmes organisations working with the target group are 
testing new advisory services, and a limited range of more intensive support, aimed at 
enabling people claiming disability benefits to return to work.  
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Although these programmes remain voluntary they now operate in a regulatory 
regime where lone parents and other working age people applying for and receiving 
state benefits are required to attend employment related interviews. From April 2001 
all lone parents who want to claim income support have to attend an interview where 
their circumstances are reviewed and where an adviser will assess their employability 
and give advice about how they could move towards self sufficiency. These and 
existing lone parents will thereafter be expected to attend reviews at least annually.  
 
In twelve ‘One’ pilot areas (see below) this approach is being tested across the full 
range of benefit recipients and people who claim disability benefits, carers benefits, 
and so on, are also required to attend employment related interviews. The policy 
objective has both an enabling and policing element but the Government has stressed 
the positive gains for individuals and have made it clear “that no-one should feel 
intimidated” and “invitations to participate should be encouraging rather than 
threatening” (ESC and SSC, 1999, p. ix). There are also a variety of deferrals and 
exemptions and apart from the JSA unemployed other individuals cannot be legally 
required to participate in a programme or take a job.  
 
The Government has supplemented its national New Deal programmes and 
‘activation’ of the benefit system with area based employment initiatives targeted at 
those localities which have the highest levels of long term unemployment and 
‘joblessness’. In 15 ‘fully fledged’ Employment Zones the Government is testing out 
the concept of ‘benefit transfer’ where contracted providers are able to combine the 
resources that were available both for benefits, training and job search into a ‘personal 
job account’ which can then be used flexibly to obtain the most appropriate support 
(initially for up to 48,000 of the long term unemployed). In 20 areas new ‘Action 
Teams’ are also being tested, initially for a year (DfEE, 2000a). The teams are 
expected to work with all ‘jobless’ people to “support radical, innovative ways” of 
tackling “specific local problems and obstacles to jobmatching”.  They are voluntary, 
work with all those who want jobs, and their effectiveness will be assessed through 
the improvement they can make in local employment rates.  These area based 
initiatives are expected to build ‘synergy’ between their activities, the New Deals  and 
the regeneration programmes being supported through other Government 
interventions, such as the ‘New Deal for Communities’ and the Single Regeneration 
Budget. 
 
‘Making Work Pay’ and the New Deals 
 
All the above programmes have been introduced alongside major tax reforms which, 
in combination with new rights at work, are aimed at ‘making work pay’. In a variety 
of ways unemployment and ‘poverty traps’ have been significantly eased as part of a 
major redistribution of resources towards poor working families and children 
(estimated to lift around 840,000 children out of poverty in the first Parliament of the 
Labour Government: Piachaud and Sutherland, 2000). It is not proposed to assess 
these policies in detail in this article, but the impact of the various tax and child care 
credits alone mean that by 2000 the Government was able to guarantee that a family 
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with a full-time worker would have a minimum income of over £10,000 a year and 
would have 70% of their child care costs met by the state (Hirsch, 2000, p. 36). 
 
In effect, through the New Deals and ‘making work pay’ the Labour Government is 
integrating the active benefit regime it inherited into the broader process of welfare 
reform through which it intends to “rebuild the welfare state around work”. In this 
new era “it is the Government’s responsibility to promote work opportunities” and 
“the responsibility of those who can take them up to do so” (HMSO, 1998a, p 23 & 
31). The critical assumption is that welfare dependency and unemployment can be 
substantially reduced by both improving the employability of working age benefit 
recipients and by connecting them more proactively to the labour market. 
 
Delivering the ‘work-based welfare state’: the Employment Service, 
Partnerships, the ‘One’ service and  the Working Age Agency  
 
Within weeks of taking office the Labour Government gave the ES the lead 
responsibility for delivering the New Deal. The senior managers of the agency 
grasped the opportunity to ‘reinvent’ the organisation and invested substantial time 
and resources in redefining its approach in order to rebuild its credibility with the 
unemployed, employers and other agencies. This involved the creation of a national 
network of local New Deal partnerships; the introduction of a new generation of front 
line personal advisers; contracting with a broad range of public, voluntary and private 
sector organisations for the delivery of new services and employment and training 
options; and changes to its performance targets which have started to encourage it to 
work with other agencies.  
 
Another key dimension to the strategy has involved a major political effort to engage 
employers and other agencies in the delivery of the New Deals. In particular 
Government has created a broad range of national and local partnerships, from the 
advisory national New Deal Task Force through to the contractual partnerships which 
deliver particular programmes. For New Labour ‘partnerships’ are now seen as the 
alternative to simplistic free market solutions and the “old centralised command and 
control systems, which stifled innovation”. The ‘third way’, favoured by the Prime 
Minister, involves creating “partnerships at local level, with investment tied to targets 
and measured outcomes, with national standards but local freedom to manage and 
innovate” (Blair, 1998, p. 15). 
 
Partnership working was an essential characteristic of the Government’s policy for 
testing a range of pilot approaches to creating what the Prime Minister originally 
announced as a ‘single work focussed gateway’ to the benefit system (at the 1998 
Labour Party Conference). What subsequently became described as ‘One’ pilots were 
to test how to integrate the delivery of, and create an employment focus to, the 
previously separate benefits claimed through the ES, the Benefits Agency and Local 
Authorities. The ‘One’ service has three key objectives (HMSO, 1998b): 
 
• to increase the sustainable level of employment by getting more benefit claimants 
into work by putting them in touch with the labour market through the 
intervention of a personal adviser; 
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• to ensure that individuals experience customer service that is efficient and tailored 
to their personal needs; and 
• to change the culture of the benefits system and the general public towards 
independence and work rather than payments and dependence. 
 
Soon after the pilot programmes were introduced the Government announced the 
creation of a new unified ‘working age agency’, with a clear focus on employment, 
which will bring together the ES and those parts of the Benefits Agency which 
support people of working age (Local Authorities are expected to continue to 
administer Housing Benefit). The new service will learn from the existing ‘One’ 
pilots and deliver a single, integrated service to all working age benefit claimants and 
employers. After bringing together central functions in 2001 the new front end 
delivery of services will be gradually rolled out across the country.1 According to the 
Prime Minister the new agency will be in the front line of the drive to modernise 
Government and will continue to develop the partnership approach to working with 
local authorities and the private and voluntary sectors that has characterised the 
implementation of New Labour’s welfare to work policies (Hansard, 16 March 2000, 
col. 257W). 
 
In fact, recent developments in labour market policy have witnessed an expansion of 
direct private sector involvement in the delivery of new services for the unemployed 
(as part of a broader redefinition of the relationship between the ES and the private 
recruitment industry). Private sector organisations, in varying combinations with the 
ES, are now responsible for delivering most Employment Zones, and in a number of 
areas are delivering the New Deals for the unemployed and the One Service. 
Although there are continuities with the market testing and drive to privatisation of 
the previous Conservative administration the Government maintains that its approach 
does not represent a prelude to full privatisation but a variation of its partnership 
strategy. The stated aim is to create new public private partnerships that harness the 
resources, expertise and innovative practices of the private sector to the delivery of 
the broad welfare to work agenda. 
 
Although initial critiques of Britain’s New Deals highlighted a lack of geographical 
and programme flexibility (Turok and Webster, 1998; Peck, 1999), the impact of 
practice and subsequent policy changes mean that in most localities significant 
variations are now emerging. In particular, different types of local New Deal 
partnerships have been given flexibilities in how they deliver, and increasingly 
sequence, their programmes and build synergy with other provision (whether funded 
through the European Social Fund, the Single Regeneration Budget, and so on). At the 
same time there is virtually no part of the country which is not participating in one or 
other of the various pilots, trials, employment zones, prototypes, or innovative 
projects which have been introduced for different groups amongst the long term 
                                                          
1 The Welfare to Work strategy and New Deal programmes apply throughout the UK but the ES and 
BA only cover GB. Devolution, and different institutional arrangements in Northern Ireland, will have 
some impact on policy and local delivery but the content and direction of welfare reform is firmly 
controlled by central UK Government. 
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jobless. As a result, it is becoming increasingly hard to distinguish the core 
programmes from the mass of variants. And the huge mixed-economy of private, 
public and voluntary sector organisations that are delivering these initiatives is 
consequently going through a remarkable period of evolution and invention. This 
delivery system is also experiencing  intense pressure with significant variations 
beginning to emerge in local performance and coherence. 
 
Participation in the New Deals  
 
By the end of July 2000, over two years after its national introduction, over half a 
million young unemployed people had started on the New Deal of whom 116,100 
were still in the programme. Of these just over half were still in the initial Gateway 
stage and a third were in one of the options. Just under one in five of those on the 
options were in subsidised jobs, over 40% were on placements in environmental 
projects or in the voluntary sector, and just under 40% were in full time education or 
training. Nearly one in five of all those still on the New Deal were in the ‘follow 
through’ period back in unemployment although the ES was expected to continue to 
try to place them in jobs. Over 70% of participants were male, about 12% reported 
having a disability or work-related health problem, and 14% were from ethnic 
minority groups (DfEE, 2000b).  
 
Of  the 402,600 young people who were no longer in the programme 159,200 or 40% 
had been placed in unsubsidised jobs;  46,200 or 11% had started to claim other 
benefits; 78,600 or 20% had entered other known destinations (for example, full time 
education); and the destination of 118,500 or nearly 30% was unknown (ibid, Table 
11). Data on retention showed that over 56,000 of those who were placed in jobs had 
left them within 13 weeks. The impact of this ‘turnover’ has been significant and the 
implications of what has been described as the ‘revolving door’ will be discussed in a 
later section. 
 
During the first year of the New Deal for young people particular concern had been 
expressed about the large number of leavers whose destinations were unknown. 
However, follow up research with a sample of this group found that 57% of those 
contacted had actually left to take up a job, though only 29% were in work at the time 
of interview. Another 25% had left because of illness or caring responsibilities, and 
another 12% were no longer looking for work (NCSR, 1999). The Government 
concluded that these findings did not suggest that significant numbers of these young 
people were at risk of exclusion. Instead they indicated that some young people were 
only tentatively engaged with the labour market and were likely to move in and out of 
jobs quickly and take intermittent advantage of the help and support offered by the 
New Deal and other programmes.  
 
The New Deal for those aged over 25 was initially restricted to those who had been 
out of work for over two years but eligibility was reduced to 18 months in April 2001 
and extra resources were put into the programme to intensify the level of support and 
variety of options. By July 2000, two years after the original programme started, there 
had been 286,900 starts, of whom 74,500 were still in the New Deal. Most of those 
who were participating in the programme were  still in the three to six month advisory 
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period  (77%), with the others moving into subsidised jobs (7%), work based training 
(12%), or other full time education or training (2%).Of those who had left the New 
Deal nearly 29,900  had gone into unsubsidised jobs; 24,100 had started to claim other 
benefits and 107,200 had returned to claim Jobseekers Allowance; 9,200 had entered 
other known destinations; and the destination of 21,200 ex-participants was unknown.  
 
Results from the New Deal for Lone Parents reflected its voluntary nature, with about 
20% of those who were asked to attend an initial interview taking up the offer. 
Between October 1998 and July 2000 174,420 lone parents attended a first  interview, 
with just under 90% agreeing to participate further. Of those who participated 57,530 
had found jobs and 14,880 had taken up education or training opportunities. Of those 
involved 95% were women, 7% were from minority ethnic groups, 3% had 
disabilities, and 22% were aged under 25 (DfEE, 2000c). An evaluation of the first 
NDLP pilots, which made detailed comparisons with matched areas without the new 
service, found that overall the net gains from programme paid for its costs, with “a 
substantial gain for both individual lone parents and for the economy as a whole” 
(Hasluck et al, 2000) 
 
New Deal Evaluation Evidence 
 
The overall labour market impact of the New Deal for the young unemployed - the 
‘flagship’ of the programme - has been hotly contested (see below). However, the 
initial findings from the many case study and other evaluations point to some 
significant progress (Hasluck, 2000a; Hasluck 2000b; Millar, 2000; R&DDES, 2000): 
 
• The Gateway period of intensive advice and assistance has been effective in 
moving young people out of unemployment. Early planning assumptions were 
that 40% of entrants would leave the New Deal from the Gateway. In reality 58% 
of participants leave before taking up an option. If those who are getting jobs in the 
‘unknown destinations’ category are included, over 60% of these young people are 
getting jobs. 
• Participation on the Gateway leads to more intensive jobsearch. The evidence 
shows a ‘carrot and stick’ effect, with most intensifying jobsearch as a result of 
increased motivation and new techniques, but others doing so in order to avoid 
joining an option or to avoid benefit sanctions. 
• New Deal Personal Advisers are playing a critical role. The evaluation evidence 
has consistently identified the intensive, individualised help from the adviser as the 
key element of Gateway success. Young people themselves place great value on 
having someone with whom they can build a relationship. Advisers provide a wide 
range of individualised services for the young person such as identifying barriers to 
work, helping with applications, contacting employers and discussing and 
clarifying employment goals. In addition to the options they can also provide 
access to additional services, ranging from referrals to substance abuse 
programmes to help with literacy and numeracy.  
• ‘Continuous Improvement’ and the Gateway. As problems have emerged, for 
example, around identifying basic skills problems or the lack of intensity of 
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contact, the Gateway has been changed to better tackle the emerging issues, albeit 
the success in some areas has been limited. 
• The performance of the options has been mixed. As a result of the impact of the 
Gateway less than 40% of entrants have progressed to options, as against the 60% 
originally anticipated. This means that those entering the options are those with the 
greatest barriers to employment. This partly explains why the job subsidy element 
of the New Deal has had less take up than anticipated and employers have been 
critical of the quality of the young people referred. Nevertheless most of the young 
people in subsidised employment have either been retained by their employer or 
have been able to get other jobs. By contrast, the job entry performance of the 
other options has been weak, with no more than 15% of participants progressing 
directly into employment.  
• The follow through period appears to be succeeding in capitalising on the 
increase in employability created through Gateway and option participation, with 
around 40% of leavers from follow through moving into employment. 
 
Despite this progress there is evidence that the implementation architecture of the 
New Deal is under considerable pressure, especially in high unemployment inner city 
areas where performance is poorest. Early evidence from reviews conducted by the 
New Deal Task Force and from unpublished research in Manchester, Portsmouth and 
other cities, has found front line New Deal advisers expressing: 
 
• concern that the individual focus of New Deal has given way to increased 
emphasis on placements, especially into unsubsidised jobs, driven by targets; 
• frustration at frequent changes in complex procedures and processes; 
• the burden of excessive paperwork; 
• the demands of caseloads made up of clients with more intractable problems who 
have to be seen regularly; and 
• frustration with the sanctions regime and the difficulty of tackling those thought to 
be (ab)using the system 
 
It has been suggested that a classic ‘implementation gap’ - first described in Lipsky’s 
seminal study of ‘street level bureaucrats’ - has emerged as the New Deal has been 
made a day to day reality (Lipsky, 1980; Blackmore, 1999). Lipsky found that front 
line officials were often overwhelmed by the competing demands of their jobs and 
often used the discretion they enjoyed to develop survival mechanisms which could 
reinterpret, deflect and even undermine public policy objectives. There is already 
evidence that the impact of the last Conservative Government’s actively seeking work 
test and ‘stricter benefit regime’ were vitiated through such an implementation gap, 
and it may be that at least in some areas the front line reality of the New Deal may be 
very different to that which the policy rhetoric suggests (Bryson and Jacobs, 1992; 
McKay et al, 1997; Finn, et al, 1998). In particular, one significant dimension of this 
gap between rhetoric and reality is that established forms of regulation and 
contestability are being redefined, if not undermined. ‘Clients’ and welfare rights 
organisations now confront an increasingly opaque system characterised by diversity, 
flexibility, increased front line discretion, and an emphasis on ‘appropriate’ behaviour 
(Ramia and Carney, 1999). 
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The Labour Market Impact of the New Deal 
 
Essentially, there are two propositions that underpin the Labour Governments welfare 
to work strategy. The first is that a more active benefit regime and New Deal 
programmes will help reduce unemployment and wage pressures, stimulate the 
economy and lead eventually to more jobs. The second assumption is that on an 
individual level the new approach will improve the employability and/or earning 
capacity of people currently living on benefits. 
 
In terms of the direct impact of the New Deals on unemployment by February 2000 
the number of 18 to 24 year olds unemployed who had been claiming JSA for over six 
months had fallen to just over 52,000. This compared with 169,500 in May 1997, 
when the New Labour Government was elected. The fall in the number unemployed 
for over a year was even more dramatic, from 85,500 to 6,100. Using the more 
rigorous international (ILO) definition of unemployment, on data collected from the 
Labour Force Survey (which includes those who are unemployed but not eligible for 
JSA) the number of young people unemployed over six months had fallen to 123,000 
in the March-May 2000 quarter from 221,000 in the February-April 1997 quarter 
(ONS, 2000, Tables 11 & 9). The sustained fall in long term unemployment has been 
less marked for the older age groups but the long term rate has still fallen faster than 
the general unemployment rate (in contrast with earlier economic recoveries when 
long term unemployment has been a ‘lagging’ indicator). 
 
Although the fall in long term unemployment durations has been significant the 
question is how much of this impact has been due to the New Deals. The early results 
from more rigorous labour market evaluations of the New Deal indicate that the 
programme was creating an additional ‘net’ labour market effect (Layard, 2000). A 
report from the National Institute of Social and Economic Research estimated that in 
its first year the New Deal for Young People had reduced youth unemployment, 
relative to what it would otherwise have been, by 30,000: equivalent to a reduction in 
long term youth unemployment of nearly 40%. This did not appear to be at the 
expense of other unemployed people. The report also suggested that while the overall 
future net impact of the programme on the economy was likely to be small, the 
programme would be self financing as the extra economic activity it generated would 
lead to higher Government revenues (Anderton et al, 2000).  
 
An update of the research, more than two years into the programme, confirmed these 
findings (R&DDES, 2000, p. 1). The overall level of youth unemployment was 
estimated to be 44,000 lower than it would have been and employment was 15,000 
higher. There were additional impacts on the overall labour market, with “overall 
employment thought to be around 30,000 higher” than it would have been without the 
programme. Within two years it was suggested that these impacts had largely offset 
the cost of the programme. 
 
In both reports, the authors acknowledged that their findings were tentative and the 
programme and research was still at an early stage. Others were more critical, 
suggesting that the findings were ‘guestimates’ producing the results the Government 
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would wish to see. The Conservative opposition has since regularly attacked the 
various New Deals, dismissing them as expensive failures, and indicating that if they 
are returned to power the New Deals will be terminated.  
 
The international evidence about the overall impact of New Deal type programmes is 
equivocal. An OECD review found that the relevant literature is bedevilled by  
complex data and technical difficulties, and the results are inconclusive, with “some 
studies appearing to show robust effects of active policies in terms of lowering the 
natural rate of unemployment or real wage pressures, others appearing to show zero or 
insignificant correlations” (Martin, 1998, p. 13). The author concludes that so far “the 
jury is still out”. 
 
Although there may be no consensus around the macro economic proposition, many 
economists and policy makers accept that there is still a strong case for investment in 
labour market programmes, on the grounds of equity, social cohesion and efficiency. 
In this context, British programme evaluation evidence has more positive implications 
for the change of direction represented in the New Deals.  
 
Control group and qualitative local studies show that the net impact of programmes 
on individual job prospects can be significant, especially where they are more 
effectively customised to individual and local labour market needs. Higher quality 
evaluations, using sophisticated comparison techniques, illustrate that earlier 
programmes which contain elements of the New Deal approach, especially those 
either directly linked with real employers or offering training, had an impact on 
employment prospects and earnings over quite long periods (see, for example, Payne 
et al, 1996; White et al, 1997). However, as White and his colleagues emphasised, the 
best results were found with programmes that were “selective, small scale and 
resource intensive” and they warned that if they were expanded in a simple way this 
could reduce their success rate (1997, p.37). A vital challenge for the New Deals, and 
the related area based initiatives, will be their capacity, through the local delivery 
mechanisms that have been established, to build on the positive impact and potential 
that these earlier programmes have demonstrated is possible. 
 
A more challenging issue, however,  involves tackling what has been described as the 
‘revolving door’, where as many as 20% of those now joining the New Deal have 
participated in the programme at least once already. For many critics this ‘revolving 
door’ and what are described as ‘jobs gaps’ remain the fundamental weaknesses of the 
‘supply side’ policies represented by the New Deal (Turok & Webster, 1998; Peck, 
1999). 
 
The ‘revolving door’: the ‘Job Retention’ and ‘Jobs Gap’ challenges 
 
In common with many other countries, the UK labour market has experienced a 
transformation as employer demand has continued to shift away from the traditional 
jobs taken by male, full-time manual workers. By 1995/96, for example, while more 
than 55% of all job takers in the UK entered full time permanent jobs, only 22% of 
the jobs taken by those out of work were full time and permanent; two thirds were 
part time or temporary. Most of the new jobs were relatively low paid and were 
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predominantly in personal services, sales and other low skilled sectors (Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 1997, p. 24). Although the good news for some was that the entry job 
could become a route to a  better job, either with the same or another employer, for 
many it was a ‘revolving door’ which led to a quick return to unemployment. In the 
same year over half the people who stopped claiming unemployment benefit were to 
become unemployed again within a year, and over 80% of those who completed 
Government training schemes also returned to unemployment (LMT, 1996). These 
labour market realities were particularly acute in many of Britain’s older cities (Turok 
and Edge, 1999).  
 
Although control group evaluations show that the better designed and resourced 
programmes of the late 1980s and early 1990s had a significant net impact on job 
prospects, and that those who participated in work based training were more likely to 
obtain secure and better paid work, the evidence also showed that large numbers of 
participants in even the best programmes were likely to return to unemployment. This 
‘revolving door’ effect may reflect labour market realities but it did great damage to 
the credibility of training and employment programmes and managing and minimising 
its impact will be one of the major tests of Labour’s New Deals. In this context, 
particular emphasis is now being placed on improving job ‘retention’ strategies, to 
ensure that New Deal participants keep the jobs they enter; on the ‘follow through’, to 
get effective assistance to those who come to the end of their placements without a 
job; and to ‘progression’, where skill training and follow up support can assist those 
who do take entry level jobs to be able to make progress to higher paid and more 
secure employment (NDTF, 1999). 
 
Critics are still dismissive. Even if policy can influence retention and progression they 
suggest that there are structural ‘jobs gaps’, especially  in Britain’s cities, and that “it 
is a supply-side fallacy to suggest that improving employability will increase the 
aggregate level of labour demand” (Peck and Theodore, 1999, p. 14; Turok and Edge, 
1999). Many high unemployment areas are failing to benefit equally from overall jobs 
growth and falling unemployment and it is argued that in these areas the New Deals 
could begin to look very much like the failed programmes of the past. Without jobs to 
go to the programme could simply waste resources and merely churn “people into and 
out of temporary projects and work placements, with no lasting reduction in 
unemployment” (Turock and Webster, 1998, p.325). 
 
Government Ministers have resisted calls to expand public sector employment in 
these areas. They point out that large numbers of the long term unemployed live close 
to areas which have job vacancies, especially in London, and that the New Deal is 
aimed at tackling the attitudinal, cultural and physical barriers that prevent them from 
competing for those jobs. They also point out that in those areas undergoing structural 
economic change there are other programmes aimed at regenerating their local 
economies. With overall registered unemployment at its lowest level for over twenty 
years, and with record numbers of people in work, Ministers and their advisers have 
now indicated that full employment is realisable and have claimed that the New Deals 
and other welfare to work initiatives had already started to have a positive impact on 
the operation of the labour market (Layard, 2000). 
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The reality is that both arguments are overstated. The evidence so far indicates that as 
Britain modernises its welfare state the New Deals are helping to secure significant if 
modest improvements in the employability and job prospects of those living on 
benefit, especially for the younger unemployed. However, there are still major 
challenges, in the high unemployment inner city areas in particular, where closing the 
‘revolving door’ and translating worthy policy objectives and theoretical design into 
effective day to day practice are likely to require something more substantial than 
Labour’s New Deals. 
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